Catchfence

With word that the IRL will return to New Hampshire Motor Speedway in July 2011, the Indy Racing League has been getting some attention apart from Dario Franchitti’s Indianapolis romp (marred by the presence of his shrewish loud mouth wife Ashley Judd) and recent races at Texas and Iowa, the scene of Tony Kanaan’s first win in several years.

There is of course Danifraud, the insufferable soft-porn actress who decided to jump into racecars and has done less with substantially more than anyone in recent racing memory. A fuel-mileage second at Texas brought her some publicity and she then followed it up the way Brett Favre follows up a successful play – she faltered, finishing a sub-mediocre tenth at Iowa.

Yet amid this, the return of IndyCar racing to New Hampshire illustrates a crossroads this form of racing is now within, as an IRL “think tank” is pondering the racing series’ future. This comes as a panel has been looking at new chassis for 2012 and beyond.

The think tank’s work is summarized by former driver Gil De Ferren in noting, “Bringing innovation and diversity back to IndyCars is something we felt was very important. It’s also very important to be cost-effective.”

This, though, illustrates the continuing problem with IndyCar racing and why this series has been torn asunder for over 30 years. By not controlling the sport’s technology, IndyCar racing has been torn by constant civil war over it, from Dan Gurney’s infamous 1978 White Paper to Jim Hal’s Chaparral ground-effects car to Roger Penske’s infamous “stock block” Mercedes engines of 1994 to the collapse of CART in the early part of the 21st century.

Technology first became an issue with the introduction of rear-engine cars in 1961, and when the winged McLaren M16 debuted it escalated speeds and costs and two years after its debut the 500 saw its blackest day in David Walther’s flight almost through the fencing and Swede Savage’s death in an inferno. Even with improvements in safety, costs and preposterous performance levels helped drive out Firestone from racing and reduced the spot’s competitive depth.

The formation of CART didn’t help matters as much as its partisans are wont to claim, for it took the demise of the CanAm Challenge Cup series – another high-tech racing series that bankrupted itself – to bail out IndyCar racing in the 1980s, and the body nearly collapsed in 1989-90 in a simmering revolt of car owners against Penske and the Newman-Haas organization.

The formation of the IRL led to outright civil war, and CART became the big loser – though it boasted “The real stars, the real cars, the real race,” in reality none of these were legitimate; they were illusory, as IRL’s retro-tech approach led to a marked increase in passing as well as opening avenues for American racers who’d been ignored by CART. By the time CART declared bankrupcy, IRL had developed a legitimate series with marque races at Kansas, Kentucky, Texas, and Chicagoland.

But in trying to get more manufacturers involved in the series, IRL was drained dry by Honda and Toyota and their fiscal recklessness. It was a shocking lapse by the series as it had made inroads in keeping technology under control and was beginning to establish a connection with American short track racers and fans – highlighted by IRL show car visits to tracks such as Stafford Motor Speeday in CT and the success of drivers such as Tony Stewart and Billy Boat.

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In its new quest to deal with the future, IRL needs to come to grips with the contradiction inherent in De Ferren’s comment about innovation and cost-effectiveness. The reality is these goals are not compatible. The retro-tech approach is why NASCAR for so long maintained growth and competitive balance as well as holding costs to a reasonable level – and why the sport’s present increase in technology has done it harm via cost and absurd performance levels. IRL needs to forget about “innovation and diversity” because the history of racing has shown that it is not possible to allow innovation without a price to pay that the sport invariably suffers from.

IRL’s cars now and in the future need to be bulky, generate a powerful drafting effect so passing is produced (and thus the league’s idiotic and ineffective “push to pass” buttons can be ripped out), and be so stable as to not slide even by an inch, so drivers can run open throttle. The rear wings need to Hanford rail, first used in 1998 in CART to generate a powerful drafting effect that worked far better than anyone expected.

The league also needs to return to tracks like Pocono. Pocono was built as an IndyCar and stock car track and as such can still accommodate IndyCars. The fan base in the Pocono area is a strong racing demographic, and even in the dark days of the CART era Pocono still could draw a solid audience for racing. Adding second dates at Texas, Chicagoland (scene of the league’s greatest races), and Kentucky should also be a priority.

Finally, the league needs to work to reconnect with the audience of American short trackers. IndyCar racing lost over an entire generation of racefans because it would not get the likes of Ted Christopher, Steve Butler, Bob Cicconi, or Kenny Irwin into Indycars and keep them there. Sam Hornish needs to quit NASCAR and return to IRL not only because he is a dismal fit with stock cars but because he can help rebuild the league’s popularity. The connection between short track racers and the big leagues has been severed and both NASCAR and IRL need to reestablish it, especially IRL.

The return of the IndyCar Pocono 500 will be a sign that IndyCar racing is really coming back.